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The successful national liberation movements of southern Africa have be-
come dominant-party regimes. However, many now face a series of political 
and economic crises that have the potential to put the region’s stability at risk.
 • Dominant-party regimes in southern Africa base their legitimacy on liberating 
the nation from colonialism and being an expression of the people’s will. How-
ever, they preside over an exclusionary social order.
 • The promotion of formal measures of democratisation which focus on periodic 
elections, formal constitutions, and the existence of opposition parties have 
had limited success in loosening the political stranglehold of dominant par-
ties. In fact, the adoption of such formal measures has given dominant parties 
a measure of international legitimacy, to varying degrees, while many of these 
nominally democratic regimes are restricting the expression of dissent, closing 
spaces for opposition, and clinging to power by constitutional amendments or 
popular referenda of questionable democratic credentials. 
 • The promotion of economic liberalisation measures – such as creating a “busi-
ness friendly” environment and courting foreign direct investment (FDI) – 
especially for the extractive sector and its associated infrastructure, has not 
provided growth in ways perceived by many to be socially just. Instead, it has 
tended to concentrate wealth in relatively narrow ruling circles, bolstering the 
power of ruling parties while contributing to growing social polarisation.
Policy Implications
Many of the social crises facing dominant-party regimes in southern Africa are 
based on complex issues of distributional justice and inclusion, which are rooted 
in their particular social contexts. Foreign partners and donors should focus less 
on promoting formal measures of democratisation and economic liberalisation, 
which can be counterproductive, and instead promote more inclusive social and 
economic programmes, such as universal basic income.
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The Role of Dominant-Party Regimes in Southern Africa
The dominant-party regimes that grew from armed liberation movements in south-
ern Africa have survived long and often tortuous processes of political and social 
transformation. This is demonstrated by the current situation in Zimbabwe, where 
President Robert Mugabe went from being a hero who brought down a pillar of 
white supremacy in the region to being held under house arrest by his own mili-
tary. Similarly, for many of their international sympathisers, the Frente de Liber-
tação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo) and the Movimento 
Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 
MPLA) went from being beacons of hope who would finally improve the lot of their 
long-suffering citizens to authoritarian cases of crony capitalism and kleptocracy, 
respectively. Namibia’s South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and, 
especially, South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) were once symbols of 
the triumph of democracy against racist oppression, with the ANC’s former leader, 
Nelson Mandela, attaining the status of a secular saint. Over the last two decades, 
though, the ANC and SWAPO seem to have joined Frelimo, the MPLA, and the Zim-
babwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) as examples of “hybrid 
regimes,” where governments combine authoritarian rule with regular elections. 
While the political lustre of many dominant-party regimes has become somewhat 
tarnished, most, with the exception of Zimbabwe, have experienced prolonged 
 periods of economic growth. South Africa, however, did so at a substantially lower 
rate than some others; though, the fall of apartheid allowed it to consolidate its 
position as the regional hegemon. After decades of being consigned to the bottom 
of the world’s politico-economic hierarchy, Mozambique and Angola were prime ex-
amples of the “Africa Rising” narrative, which describes a supposedly more liberal 
version of the East Asian tigers’ dramatic economic success. 
The nations in question have vast mineral wealth, impressive economic potential, 
and are essential for the stability of the region. However, all are now facing deep-seated 
political and economic crises to varying degrees. The specifics differ for each country, 
but issues of growing inequality and social polarisation, widespread and seemingly 
permanent unemployment and underemployment (especially for the youth), narrow 
and unresponsive forms of political representation, high rates of violent crime, labour 
militancy, social unrest, and political violence are all increasingly common (Southall 
2013). In response, international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
donors, and foreign governments are calling for yet more reforms based on measures 
of liberalisation, democratisation, and transparency. While elements of these reforms 
may be beneficial, many of the problems faced by dominant-party regimes stem from 
complex questions of distributive justice and inclusion – problems that the formal 
methods of many proposed reforms are ill-equipped to solve.
Although all dominant-party regimes have their rule ratified by forms of demo-
cratic process and elections – which could be termed “free and fair,” albeit to differ-
ing extents – these parties base their legitimacy on their earlier roles in liberating 
their respective nations through armed struggle, and they remain the dominant pol-
itical forces in the region long after winning independence. Mozambique’s Frelimo 
and Angola’s MPLA have held power since independence in 1975. Both movements 
have survived brutal civil wars (Mozambique 1977–1992, Angola 1975–2002) and 
transitions to multiparty democracy while managing to consolidate their positions 
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to such a degree that they largely behave as elected single-party states. In Zim-
babwe the ZANU–PF stayed loyal to its leader, Robert Mugabe, for 37 years des-
pite a catastrophic economic crisis and being forced into a government of national 
unity with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T). 
Mugabe’s rule finally became untenable not as a result of widespread opposition to 
his programme or his political record but due to internal jockeying for power. When 
Mugabe fired the long-time party’s security chief and his expected successor, Em-
merson Mnangagwa, as part of a wider attempt to purge the old guard and to clear 
the way for his deeply unpopular wife to succeed him, the military stepped in and 
placed Mugabe under house arrest, while ZANU–PF expelled Mugabe and his wife 
and started impeachment proceedings. [1]
The last movements to overthrow colonial/settler regimes, Namibia’s SWAPO 
(took power in 1989) and South Africa’s ANC (took power in 1994) have commanded 
massive democratic majorities since independence, leaving few significant checks 
on their power. All dominant-party regimes benefit from a substantial bureaucratic 
capability in comparison to opposition parties, tending to operate as oligarchical 
machines. Additionally, all maintained power after the death, retirement, or re-
moval of their charismatic founding leaders. In all of the above-mentioned coun-
tries it is very difficult to differentiate between the ruling party and the state, which 
are often popularly seen as being synonymous (Southall 2013; Sumich 2015). 
Power and Contestation 
These very same hegemonic organisations that have profoundly shaped their re-
spective nations, and whose cadres claim will remain in power for generations to 
come, appear increasingly fragile. Growing social polarisation, economic crises, 
and flagrant cases of corruption have weakened the social base of each movement. 
South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, is facing 783 charges of corruption, includ-
ing receiving kickbacks from arms deals, using public funds to build a luxurious 
personal compound, and facilitating “state capture” for the Gupta family, promin-
ent businessmen and close allies of the president. Eduardo dos Santos, the former 
president of Angola, has presided over what is widely described as a “kleptocracy”: 
his family and allies control numerous sectors of the economy, and his daughter 
Isabel was – until recently – head of the state-run oil company and is the richest 
woman in Africa. Events in Zimbabwe, though, have demonstrated the potential 
divisiveness for dominant-party regimes of concentrating economic and political 
power in dyn asties. Accordingly, the new Angolan president fired Isabel dos San-
tos from her post shortly after the Zimbabwean military placed Robert Mugabe 
 under house arrest. Mozambique was recently brought to the brink of economic 
collapse after a bond to construct a state-owned tuna fleet was revealed to involve 
over a billion US dollars of hidden debt. The ZANU–PF elite have used their power 
to profit from the economic crisis in numerous sectors. Corruption in Namibia’s 
inter national tender programme was featured in the recent Panama papers as were 
numerous cases of kickbacks involving Chinese businesses. The adoption of vari-
ous forms of neo-liberal capitalism has greatly increased the wealth of the ruling 
elite, who have been the primary beneficiaries of various economic projects and 
reforms (e.g. privatisation) and whose political and economic interests are increas-
1 Emmerson Mnangagwa 
was sworn in as the presi-
dent of Zimbabwe on  
24 November 2017.
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ingly opaque (Southall 2013; Sumich 2015). Glaring corruption and impunity has 
grabbed the headlines and has caused growing social resentment. 
Country Transparency index (2016, ranked out of 176 countries)
Angola 164
Mozambique 142
Namibia 53
South Africa 64
Zimbabwe 154
Spectacular cases of corruption, which tend to dominate the headlines and often 
generate widespread disgust, should be seen not in isolation but rather as the most 
obvious examples of the ways in which party-dominated networks have formed 
 crony capitalist economies that reward insiders while excluding others.
While dominant-party regimes benefit massively from controlling the state 
machinery and all the advantages of incumbency, almost all are currently facing 
increasingly vocal discontent, prompting coercive state responses. Zimbabwe has 
routinely deployed violence to ensure its power and, as demonstrated by recent 
events, the ruling party is increasingly intertwined with the military and the other 
security forces. Mozambique faced four years (2013–2017) of low-intensity conflict 
with the former rebel movement and now major opposition party Resistência Na-
cional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, Renamo). The MPLA treats 
almost any form of protest harshly, with security forces responsible for numerous 
abuses. South Africa has long faced service delivery protests and labour disputes 
which have escalated into violence. More recently, the student-led Rhodes Must Fall 
movement – which started as a campaign to remove the statue of arch-imperialist 
Cecil Rhodes from the University of Cape Town – has swept through universities, 
with students protesting the continuation of black marginalisation. The demonstra-
tions caused numerous schools to close and resulted in confrontations with the au-
thorities. Even though most dominant-party regimes are likely to maintain their 
hold on power in the short term, the future appears increasingly precarious. 
The Meaning of Democracy for Dominant-Party Regimes
Dominant-party regimes have adapted elements of democratisation to enhance 
their power without creating a climate of tolerance towards forms of opposition. 
Some – such as the ANC, SWAPO, and ZANU–PF (in the first election) – had free, 
non-racialised franchise and elections as a central demand of their liberation strug-
gles. Other movements – such as Frelimo and the MPLA – took a dim view of multi-
party elections yet were, as part of the peace treaties bringing longstanding civil 
wars to an end, forced to embrace them. While all now hold periodic elections, the 
ways in which these parties understand democracy is often at odds with the liberal 
model. Frelimo and the MPLA have long conceived of themselves as the legitimate 
expression of the people’s will, writ large, which is periodically ratified by elections. 
They fought to free the nation and formed the state. They are not simply one of sev-
eral movements, ideologies, or trends seeking to shape the nation by representing 
Table 1. 
Transparency Levels 
in Southern Africa, 
2016 
Source: Transparency 
International 2017.
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a fraction of the population, however large; in many important ways they are the 
nation, and those outside their orbit are suspect citizens at best. Southall (2013) 
 argues that democracy meant majoritarian rule for the ANC, SWAPO, and ZANU–
PF and that since the liberation movements express the will of the majorities, their 
ascents to power are democracy. Anything that threatens their privileged place in 
the political order is tainted with the possibility of reactionary backsliding by agents 
of the old regime. Democratic reforms based largely on ensuring regular elections 
and the adoption of some liberal principles have been readily absorbed by domin-
ant-parties without instilling a climate of compromise or cooperation. A possible 
exception could be South Africa, where the ANC is vigorously challenged by both the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) on the right and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 
on the left. However, the DA, the leading opposition party, is a historically white 
party (although the current leader is now black) and is still viewed with suspicion 
by sections of the black majority. Furthermore, the DA’s centre-right, pro-business 
political orientation is unlikely to alleviate the plight of the poor. On the other hand, 
Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF, is an anathema to South Africa’s minority 
groups (i.e. whites, Indians, and “coloureds”) and is widely distrusted by much of 
the nation’s middle class. It would be difficult for either party to build a social base 
sufficient enough to take state power.
The centralisation of power is reinforced through the ways in which dominant 
parties function. This is especially evident in countries like Mozambique and An-
gola, where – in the post-socialist period – dominant parties operate not only as 
political organisations that effectively control the state but also often serve as net-
works that link far-flung territories to the political centre. For instance, a village in 
Angola or Mozambique may not have a functioning health clinic but will most likely 
have a representative of the ruling party – an organisation that provides one of the 
major avenues of social mobility for the fortunate few that can demonstrate loyalty 
and worth. Programmes instituted by major donors to install “good governance” 
and create liberal democracy have paradoxically allowed parties to grow stronger 
and entrench themselves more deeply by accessing wealth and resources and gain-
ing a veneer of international legitimacy. This does not mean that such systems are 
completely monolithic, as dominant parties are the centre of political and economic 
power and thus also become arenas of brutal factionalist competition. It is the out-
comes of these factional fights, often conducted far from the prying eyes of out-
siders, that tend to determine the overall policy of the state. In countries like South 
Africa and Namibia (and, to a lesser degree, Zimbabwe before the land invasions) 
dominant parties operate in a similar, if more racialised, manner. Given that much 
of the economic power was concentrated in the hands of the descendants of the set-
tler elite, party structures offered new avenues for political and economic mobility 
among the party faithful (Southall 2013). Despite the egalitarian ethos championed 
during the liberation struggle, the most successful individuals have been members 
of groups that could claim some sort of middle-class status. These types of rela-
tionships create constituencies in the midst of widespread deprivation that, even if 
alien ated from it, are often dependent on the party. 
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The Economy and Exclusion
With the exception of South Africa and Zimbabwe, most dominant-party regimes 
in southern Africa have enjoyed a long period of robust economic growth; how-
ever, this has not occurred in ways widely perceived as socially just. Now, almost all 
face far more difficult economic circumstances with the global drop in demand for 
natural resources, and internal tensions are becoming increasingly acute. Despite 
attempts to introduce various industrialisation programmes over the years, many 
southern African nations (with the exception of South Africa, although it has also 
undergone extensive deindustrialisation) retain their colonial economic position as 
exporters of raw materials. Increasingly, this economic model is taking the form 
of enclaves, mines, oil platforms, special export zones, plantations, and factories 
with special rights. These extractive networks are characterised by forms of inter-
twined sovereignty between local authorities, the state, and transnational actors 
– each with their own regulations, ideas about rights, infrastructures, and services. 
Enclaves form a “hierarchy of rights,” creating new forms of inclusion and citizen-
ship (Buur, Nystrand, and Pedersen 2017). Simply being able to obtain some sort of 
stable and secure employment is a mark of privilege throughout most of southern 
Africa. Official statistics for the region often do a poor job of capturing the immense 
social complexity, the variety of employment forms and practices, and the power re-
lationships subsumed by the seemingly straightforward term “employment,” while 
often relying on ambiguous and/or contradictory data. For example, estimates of 
Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate range from 5.09 per cent (Trading Economics 
2017) to 90 per cent (The Zimbabwean 2017) for the same period. However, what 
can be gleaned from official estimates is the scale of unemployment in the region.
Country Unemployment rate
Angola 26% in 2013, from 25% in 2012
Mozambique 24.37% in 2016, from 24.67% in 2015
Namibia 34% in 2016, from 28.10% in 2014
South Africa 27.7% in 2017, from 26.5% in 2016
In a situation of widespread unemployment, enclaves create small numbers of rela-
tively privileged workers who benefit from increased services. Dissenters, however, 
generally live under the threat of violent repression, which was used to deal with 
striking miners in Mozambique and South Africa and illegal diamond miners in 
Angola and Zimbabwe. Kirshner and Power argue that mining enclaves in Tete 
province, Mozambique, are reshaping both economic life and urban planning, re-
creating deeply exclusionary colonial models of company rule, on the one hand, and 
drawing local elites more tightly into international networks, on the other (Kirshner 
and Power 2015: 70). Enclaving as a model is increasingly becoming a wider spatial 
logic of privilege as evidenced by the meteoric rise in the number of gated com-
munities (there are now more than 80 in the Mozambican capital of Maputo alone; 
Mazzolini 2016), restricted areas, forced removals of the poor from desirable areas 
of cities, and – even in some cases – the construction of entirely new cities to house 
the middle class and the elite away from the insecurity, crime, and dilapidated in-
frastructure that less privileged urbanites are forced to contend with. 
Table 2 
Unemployment Rates 
in Southern Africa
Source: Trading Eco-
nomics 2017.
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The growing pervasiveness of an “enclaved” economic and residential model, 
which creates fortified islands of relative privilege cut off from wider society, contra-
dicts the major claims of dominant-party states that the party is the embodiment of 
the people’s will. The victory of former liberation movements has not ushered in a 
new age of equality, as can be seen by the Gini coefficient.
Country Gini Coefficient (in 2013)
Angola 42.7
Mozambique 45.7
Namibia 63.9
South Africa 63.1
Zimbabwe 50.1 (in 2006, last available figure)
As with unemployment statistics, these figures give us an idea of the scale of the 
problem but tell us little about the underlying social complexity or the web of de-
pendence and obligation that structures the social order. In his discussion of de-
pendence and personhood in South Africa, James Ferguson (2013) contends that, 
in a situation where personhood is seen as a relational concept instead of an au-
tonomous individual, dependence can create broader relationships and mutual ob-
ligations in hierarchical political systems. Such political systems were frequently 
paternalistic, brutal, and exploitative but tended to follow a cultural logic of inclu-
sion. They were “people hungry” and sought to increase the membership of the 
polity. While this was based on cruel and widely resented subordination, there was 
the possibility of security and even upward mobility. Examples include apartheid-
era South Africa’s never-ending need for mining labour or socialist Mozambique’s 
ambitious attempts to (forcibly, if need be) transform and include the peasantry 
in the party’s nation-building project through villagisation and collective farming. 
However, many former national liberation movements have come to embrace a pol-
itical and economic model that simply does not require such vast attempts at social 
mobilisation. The result being that the majorities in such countries are banished to 
the so-called subsistence or informal sectors (Ferguson 2013: 233; see also Sumich 
2015). Not only does this approach increase social polarisation, but it does so in a 
way that dramatically undermines existing ideas of what is considered socially just. 
To illustrate this point, Ferguson (2013: 236) refers to a political opinion poll in 
which “the majority of South Africans agreed with the statement ‘people are like 
children, the government should take care of them like a parent.’” I am not aware 
if similar polls exist in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, or Zimbabwe, but one fre-
quently hears such sentiments. Phrases like “the government needs to give me a 
job” and “the government needs to take care of us” are common. The problem is not 
necessarily that the state is paternalistic, enforcing a rigid hierarchy that represses 
the entrepreneurial energies of its citizens, but rather that it is a bad parent, abu-
sive and neglectful of its children. Further difficulties remain even for the small 
minority lucky enough to be included in the formal economy. Many major economic 
enterprises in southern Africa often have deeply racialised labour hierarchies, with 
white expatriates, white South Africans, and Asians numerically over-represented 
in management and supervisory positions. This tends to create a situation rem-
iniscent of the old colonial order, the overthrow of which has been the basis for 
Table 3. 
Gini Coefficient for  
Southern African  
Countries, 2013
Sources: United 
Nations Development 
Programme (2017) and 
Central Intelligence 
Agency (2017). 
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the legitimacy of dominant-party states. The increasing impatience with perceived 
colonial legacies is not restricted solely to questions of labour, as can be seen with 
the Rhodes Must Fall movement, which was initiated by South African university 
students – many of whom attend prestigious institutions and come from middle-
class social backgrounds.
Do Proposed Solutions Reinforce the Problem?
The methods recommended to countries more dependent on donors (e.g. Mozam-
bique and Namibia) and to international organisations (e.g. the IMF, World Bank, 
and G20) for dealing with the multiple crises in southern African dominant-party 
states tend to be based on variants of democratisation, economic liberalisation, 
and anti-corruption initiatives. A prime example is the G20’s Compact with Africa. 
Kappel and Reisen (2017: 3) argue that in the Compact with Africa (CWA) “macro-
economic measures have an orthodox agenda, with a set of well-known (neoliberal) 
recommendations: fiscal discipline, redirecting public expenditure, tax reform, fi-
nancial liberalisation, elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment, privatisa-
tion of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of market entry and competition, and 
security of property rights.” Very similar sets of measures have been proposed mul-
tiple times in the last 30 years and still largely fail to achieve their ostensive goals.
Southern Africa has long been characterised by democratic deficits, deep- seated 
economic problems, and pervasive corruption.  Thus, the methods proposed by do-
nors, international organisations, and foreign governments (such as Ger many’s 
CWA) – which have been employed for decades – will not change the regional 
situation. Dominant parties in southern Africa have proven highly adept at intro-
ducing elements of liberalism to more authoritarian political systems. They have 
melded together constitutional promises of a wide array of civic and social rights 
and regular elections into their own conceptions of democracy. Most dominant par-
ties operate as political machines that are highly successful at winning elections 
through means both legal and illicit; in fact, in certain southern African nations 
powerful organisations like the military are unlikely to accept the electoral defeat 
of the dominant party. In Zimbabwe the military currently acts as the preeminent 
power broker. Nevertheless, despite deposing Robert Mugabe – a move that gained 
it considerable popularity – the military has thus far refused to rule in its own right. 
Instead, it appears to have acted in an effort to bolster the power of allied factions 
and individuals within ZANU–PF. 
Even in cases where the opposition could take power, doubts remain about the 
transformative potential of such an event. In many southern African nations it is 
not clear how opposition parties differ ideologically from ruling parties despite the 
fact that opposition parties represent different constituencies and are skilled in em-
ploying buzzwords like “transparency.” Moreover, economic constraints in the re-
gion also currently cast doubt on how extensively they could transform the system. 
Liberal economic reforms have allowed many dominant parties in southern Africa 
to more deeply entrench themselves in the political and economic fabric of their 
respective nations. Due to the wealth brought about by natural resource exports, the 
monopolisation of access to donors, the role of high-ranking cadres in dominating 
the economy through privatisation programmes, and partnerships with transnation-
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al conglomerations, dominant parties have been able to centralise wealth and power 
in ways that would have been impossible under earlier, leftist-inspired political pro-
jects. Therefore, whether opposition movements are able to drastically reform the 
system or will simply preside over what already exists remains an open question. 
The ability of elite actors to engage in corruption with relative impunity is also a ser-
ious social problem and should be dealt with by legal means. How ever, a criminally 
punitive approach only addresses certain aspects of corruption as it appears in daily 
life, ignoring other potent manifestations. As Yazan Doughan (2017) points out, cor-
ruption also encompasses more subtle – though not technically illegal – practices, 
such as economies of favours within closed, party-based political and kin networks 
that concentrate privilege, resources, and opportunities among certain groups to the 
detriment of others. Several of the underlying problems faced by  dominant-party 
states in southern Africa arise from complex questions of distributive justice and 
inclusion that are rooted in the histories and particular social contexts of the nations 
in question. Generic measures of democratisation and liberalisation not only have 
failed to address these problems but may have also contributed to growing social 
polarisation. Even the extensive welfare grants and programmes provided by South 
Africa have largely failed to diminish rampant inequality. The region requires new 
ideas that are less dogmatically based on the reigning ideol ogies of donor nations 
and are tailored not only to attract FDI but also to create more inclusive societies. 
Both within the region and among donors, there is a real need for in-depth discus-
sions concerning the distribution of state profits and natural resources more widely 
among the population. Furthermore, the possibility of introducing mechanisms that 
guarantee everyone, regardless of social status or political affiliation, access to uni-
versal provisions, such as a basic income, should also be explored.  
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